Weird Studies/Courses/Bergson

27 Sep 2025 - 28 Oct 2025
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    • Course review

      • I was initially a bit reluctant to take this course because I have never quite gotten the thing about Bergson, and I wasn't sure if he was someone I could (or should) make the effort to understand. I'm still not quite sure. But at least I know what he was about, and even have a sense of why and how his quiet radicalism was such a powerful force in the world for awhile (and perhaps continues).
      • Bergson is a historically important thinker even if he has mostly lapsed into obscurity, JFM is an enthusiastic and well-learned Bergsonian. He clearly has a deep love for the man and his thinking, and was trying to transmit these deep feelings to the class, mostly successfully. I think he would not mind being called a bit of a Bergson cultist – he sees in him not just a bunch of ideas, but an intellectual revolution that is ongoing and necessary. He sees someone who boldly stood up for his own vision which he pursued relentlessly with consistency, integrity, and relentless confidence. A true singular genius who still has much to contribute to the world, the leader of a revolution that might have failed but the underlying hope is still alive.
      • My big problem with the course stems from this cultish aspect, I think. The first lecture included the instruction to "assume Bergson was right about everything" – in other words, argument was not welcome. That might have been appropriate for the material, but it put me off – I like to argue, I need to argue with things, I am not very good at accepting authority. A character flaw perhaps, but there it is.
      • This is a problem not just with the course, but with Bergson himself, the nature of his thinking. His "intuition" is supposed to be a form of knowledge outside of rational critical thought, so not really amenable to argument. He's anti-intellectual in the sense he does not really put a high value on conceptual thought.
      • This creates a kind of genre problem: to me, Bergson makes more sense when taken as a kind of spiritual teaching than as an intellectual philosophy (a lot of it sounds like Taoism with too many words). When I listen to spiritual teachings, I don't want to argue with them, that would be inappropriate, rude, crude, and dumb. But that is not the way I approach thinking. There, ideas have to be battle-tested.
      • The problem is that Bergson presents as this uneasy mix of philosophy (appropriate to criticize) and spirituality (not), and that confuses me, although I guess there is nothing inherently wrong with the combination.
      • There may be deeper problems, call it a metaphysical loyalty issue. Weird Studies (and Bergson) see themselves on one side of a battle against a certain set of cultural forces, call it rationalism, scientism, materialism, atheism, skepticism, modernism or some other name for a certain mode of being, or whatever you want to call it (a cosmogonic force in Technic and Magic ) Technic, the bad guys, are locked in battle with Magic, the good guys. The disenchanters vs the enchantment-cravers. The noble human spirit vs the inhuman machine.
      • Let's just say I have deep roots in the bad guy side, having spent most of my life around technology. I've always struggled against its limits and tried to integrate other stuff (or I wouldn't be taking a course on Bergson), but it's an uphill battle sometimes.
      • Here's an epigraph for the course, via one of the other students:
      • So that as rational metaphysics teaches that man becomes all things by understanding them, this imaginative metaphysics shows that man becomes all things by not understanding them. For when he does not understand, he makes the things out of himself and becomes them by transforming himself into them. — Giambattista Vico, The New Science (Book II, §405)
    • disclaimers

      • To anyone reading the following:
        • Most of what's here is rough notes, not polished writing, so may not be comprehensible.
        • I've only dabbled in Bergson's ideas and it might well be that I am misconstruing them, or arguing with cartoon versions of them. Most of my objections are obvious and are probably answered somewhere.
        • Whenever I get frustrated because he doesn't make sense, that might just be a me problem, even if I'm cursing his obscurity.
        • I'm not out to be rude to anybody's sacred values, but they may get trampled on regardless.
    • tl;dr

      • Bergson seems to be trying to get at the reality of lived experience, which is not subject to analytic thought. "Durée" and "intuition" gesture at this ineffable underlying reality that is beyond language. He seems to be trying to describe the Tao, but with too many words. Endless paragraphs about the ineffable, and drawing all sorts of conclusions from it. Trying to logic with it, even though it is supposed to be beyond logic. It's occasionally beautiful but mostly maddening to me. Like – if I want to get a feel for duree, I can sit on my ass and meditate, and get at least the occasional glimpse, perhaps more.
      • I think Bergson is tripped up by the methods of philosophy, even as he tries to go beyond them. All these essences and differences and dualisms. He is quite consciously trying to do philosophy in areas where philosophy doesn't work. He's inventing a new (or old) form of knowledge, "intuition", which is mostly defined in negation to normal knowledge. It's how we know the things we can't talk about.
      • I believe it is exactly the same thing brain-lateralization fans like to call right-brain thinking, but that probably sounds like a crass paraphrase to a proper Bergsonian, for which duree is more than a mode of thought, it is a mode of knowing far beyond thought. Bergson's concept of duree | Claude
      • We all know the reality of time. Materialist, idealist, theist, free-willist, determinist – all of us are embedded in time and know in our bones what that means, theories aside. The world is happening and we are happening with it, since we are part of it. I think Bergson is saying something like this (with approximately 10^3 more words). He is pointing out this reality, giving it a name (duree) and highlighting its importance.
      • This experienced time is more fundamental than clock time, and to the extent we treat time as clock time we falsify our experience. Bergson is obviously not against clock time, he has plenty of regard for science but he doesn't love it, that is reserved for the more mysterious and ineffable duree.
      • On that one big thing, I can be down with Bergson, nothing to argue with there, he is trying to find ways to talk about our everyday basic experience.
      • But the details of the way he does this just make me crazy. The idea of spatialized time. Images. Direct perception. These all sound like bad ideas, that conflict with what we actually know about the world.
      • His "images" metaphysics just seems like an attempt to solve the mind/body problem with an unsuccessful verbal rebranding. Calling everything images does nothing, there is no explanatory power.
      • "Direct perception" makes zero sense to me. We know how perception works, and it isn't direct, it's mediated by the signal processing capabilities of the nervous system. Somehow memory, like perception, is also non-representational – it involves direct access to the past, but that makes approximately zero sense to me.
    • as-iffing Bergson

      • In this section I wall try to be a good student and accept the premises of the course – that Bergson was fundamentally right, which means my basic default belief– that the mind is basically mechanical or computational, a function of the biocomputer of the nervous system – is out. OK. See We are Software where I debate (in my head) with David Bentley Hart on this question. We are not software, our minds cannot be captured in these mechanical contrivances, neither the finicky logicist kind or the more modern data-and-statistics kind.
      • So forget all that. Those mechanics are incidental, uninteresting. Real perception is direct, the image of a thing is directly present to us. You see a tree and you know the tree, the fact that light and color and nerve impulses were involved does not matter, that's just the machinery that makes the Real Act of Perception possible.
      • The "you" in the above scenario – the perceiver – is not a machine, not a body, but something else (I am not sure what). What is the mind if not software? Let us ask the oracle Bergson's critique of mechanical mind | Claude
        • According to Bergson, the mind (or consciousness, memory, duration) is fundamentally virtual reality that actualizes itself. It's not a substance or mechanism but:
        • Duration itself - continuous, heterogeneous becoming
        • Memory - the preservation of the past in itself (not stored somewhere, but existing virtually)
        • Qualitative multiplicity - "real without being actual, ideal without being abstract" (as Proust put it)
        • Internal difference - constantly differentiating itself, creating novelty
      • Gotta say that means absolutely nothing to me. But despite temptation to sweep it away as nonsense, I must be charitable. There's something kind of Zen-koan about his terminology, like, the words may be nonsense but they point to something beyond words, which is anything but nonsensical, it's Being itself, the unnamable ground of everything.
      • So mind (my mind, right now) is duration, this fundamental temporal process, a kind of virtuality that continually actualizes itself. Writing this sentence, eg. It's a creative act, I am (somehow) turning possibilities (virtualities) into real words. Each moment of living is a creative act, even if the product is not as obviously visible.
      • The Bergsonian mind is just ordinary mind, the kind that is ever present but we usually can't see or talk about. Consciousness, self-hood, agent-hood. Some quality selves have, autopoeisis maybe although that doesn't quite grasp it. That Thing We Are that is not mechanical, not subject to causation but the source of it, because it is capable of free action.
      • Perhaps I don't even have to discard my computational materialism; that's just the implementation.
    • Bergsonian mathematics

      • Bergsonian mathematics exploration | Claude This clarifies for me a few things about Bergson's relationship with Riemann. Also reminds me of what I feel is the most glaring and obvious mistake in Bergson, which apparently only I can see: that he incorrectly conflates different dualities. Everything has to pick a side in this cosmic war, but the allies don't always make sense to me.
      • Eg: he notes quite rightly both that space is different from time, and continuous is different from discrete. But then he also assumes that these dualisms are parallel, that it somehow follows that space is discrete and time is continuous, which is pretty obviously false, certainly not supported by physics. Measurable/immeasurable is another of these conflated dualisms.
      • Underlying this error is a kind of poetic valorization; time and the continuous are the neglected good guys in this fairy tale: oppressed, ignored, invisible to rationality and so they must be approached through something else (intuition). But knowing the continuous is exactly what Riemann and mathematics (analysis and topology) do, is figure out how to reason about continuous spaces.
      • I suggested Laws of Form as Bergsonian mathematics and Claude (of course) thought that was brilliant. I in turn thought this passage it generated was really good, something I could wish I had written myself:
      • Your nomination is spot-on: If Bergsonian mathematics exists, it must look something like Laws of Form - simultaneously rigorous and mystical, formal and generative, mathematical and philosophical, accepted and rejected.
    • Unasked Questions

      • I got shy in office hours so never asked these.
      • One thing that's cropped up before is how Bergson's philosophy should be affected by modern scientific developments in neurology, cognitive science, cybernetics, information theory. These all happened mostly after his time (well neurology had been around for awhile). I think one thing that's made it hard for me to read Bergson is the overlap in concerns (mind/body dualism) but different kind of solutions. These solutions might not invalidate Bergson. I suspect he'd adapt his theories to these mechanistic models. But they make it hard to understand because they have very different models of things like perception and representation. So Question 1: what do you think the relationship between these two ways of thinking are, or should be? What would Bergson have thought of it if he lived to overlap with cybernetics?
      • To try to answer my own question: cybernetics etc are all about describing systems from the outside, Bergson is describing time and being from within. So nothing about Bergson changes. But then it really makes Bergson closer to spiritual teaching than science.
      • Nothing wrong with that I guess. It's the confusion between the two. But cybernetics also has some aspirations beyond normal science, it has a spiritual component itself. And there's a strain of it that obviously is kinda-Bergsonian (Varela and other embodiment people).
    • Theses on Duration

      • This is JFM's concise summary points of Bergson's theory of duration, with my interspersed (and occasionally dumb) comments.
      • a) The scientific intellect cannot measure time; what it measures are simultaneities in space.
      • b) When we “measure” time, we substitute spatial positions for temporal flow (durée).
        • This seems wrong – all measures are substitutional, nothing special about time. Any act of measurement reduces some physical difference to a number, by definition. A digital clock counts discrete segments of time, voltages and circuitry are involved, but no space particularly. I actually have no idea what "simultaneities in space" means.
        • I'm reminded of the paper The Semantics of Clocks by Brian Cantwell Smith, which is exactly about how clocks are both embedded in causality (time) and indicate things about it.
        • See the section below

          Discussion of time measurement

      • c) The intellect, by nature, aims at fixities, “things-made,” rather than processes, or “things-in-the-making.”
        • All measures involve fixities; all thought to an extent (so I am agreeing). But we have a lot of intellectual tools for talking about processes – Newtonian calculus, computation, process algebras, systems theory and cybernetics. It's true that this isn't easy and the natural tendency of thought is towards fixities, it takes effort to talk about process and becoming, and we need better tools and languages.
        • If you substitute "Western philosophy" for "intellect" I would agree more. The Greeks had this thing for stasis that we are still trying to fix thousands of years later.
      • d) Duration is the continuous, qualitative, and irreversible flow of becoming, necessarily excluded by the intellect.
        • I do not know its name. I call it Tao (or durée, but same difference). And if duration is necessarily excluded by the intellect, why are we spending so much time talking about it? and what can we hope to say about this ineluctable aspect of being, or whatever it is?
      • e) Duration is not “psychological time.”
        • Why not? I think because that sounds trivializing. But lets say there is some primordial absolute time like duree, and psychological time is our experience of it, whereas scientific time is a chopped-up measured version if it. Is that sort of close? .
        • Yeah JFM talks about "illusory" time, equating psychological to that, but that is wrong.
      • f) It is clock-time, that is artificial, conventional, and thus, psychological. It is a spatialized construct useful for science.
        • Well of course it's artificial, not so sure about psychological.
        • Here's something that irritates me. Always this competitive dualism, science time vs. duree. But they aren't opposites or competitors. I think Bergson would actually agree but because philosophy we keep coming back to these antitheses/dualisms, my good time vs your bad time. You can kind of see Bergson trying not to do this but falling back into the pattern anyway, because (I guess) that's just how philosophy works.
        • My best take: there is some basic temporal process to the universe, call it durée if you like. Then clock time and experiential time are two views or versions or aspects of it. Neither is quite the whole thing itself.
      • g) Science (analysis) is valid only in a universe that endures, and thus presupposes duration even while excluding it.
        • Mr. Gotcha! I hate this form of argument and this one seems particularly irritating (yes scientists exist, so my theory must be true).
      • h) There is a difference in kind, not merely in degree, between space and time: the first cut.
        • Yes even Einsteinian physics says so (the negative time coefficient in Minkowski spacetime matrix). Although "in kind, not merely in degree" doesn't really mean anything, it sounds like philosophy-brain.
      • i) Intuition makes the cut: it must become the method by which duration can be grasped directly.
        • Not sure what cut means. I may be quibbling here, but my position is that duration, if it is the unnameable, indivisible ground of being, is actually not graspable at all – directly or indirectly. Intuition might be a name for our attitude towards it, although probably not one I'd choose, it's misleading. We do know it in a way, by being part of it, it is at the very core of our being.
      • j) To live is to endure: duration is the substance of existence itself, not an added dimension.
        • I'm OK with this? I mean yay existence, I'm not sure calling it "duration" adds anything. But sure, there is some reality we are part of, and it is temporal in nature.
    • Discussion of time measurement

      • From A post on the course community forum, in response to the above theses on duration. It's a closed forum so only including my own text here; the rest is at the link (registration required).
      • Original post

        • I realize I do not grasp the first 2 theses on duration (we aren't supposed to disagree, so assuming my understanding is faulty);
        • a) The scientific intellect cannot measure time; what it measures are simultaneities in space. b) When we “measure” time, we substitute spatial positions for temporal flow (durée).
        • I don't see anything special about how time is measured, compared to any other physical quantity. To measure something is to reduce some physical difference to a number. You can measure space with a ruler (a standardized measure of length); you can measure time with a clock (which contains a standardized measure of time; some kind of of mechanical or electrical oscillator with a fixed period). Same sort of process, and no spatialization required.
        • If the point is that measuring time in this way leaves out some essential quality of the thing being measured, well yes, but all measurement does that.
        • If the point is something like, time does not stand still to be measured, like space does, but is always flowing – also true, but we have ways to measure it regardless, so this is not a good way to express that point.
        • If the point is, there is something special, ineluctable, inexpressible about time and our experience of it – again, sure, 100%, but not a good way to make the point.
        • (Also I am not sure what "simultaneities in space" means, but I don't think time measurement requires them).
        • Apologies if i am being dim. My general feeling is that Bergson's main point is one i very much agree with, to the extent I understand it, but i don't like the way he gets there. Maybe it's quibbling.
      • To David Johnson

        • Time and space are both dimensions, but they aren't the same, both in physics and in lived experience. They can both be measured, by processes that are roughly similar (not identical)
        • In both cases, measurement requires dividing up a smooth continuum, and measures do not capture the full richness of what they are measuring (because that's how measurement works)
        • This is sort of a common-sense, humdrum, industrial way of looking at time and space. It's not the whole story.
        • Duree – well, I don't understand it fully, but it seems to be more like time as lived experience. We are embedded in time. The default view makes it seem like we can be outside time, viewing it like we would a calendar (an everyday form of a block-universe), but in fact we are always inside of it.
        • It sometimes feels like these two views of time are in conflict, but they shouldn't be, they describe the same thing from different viewpoints.
      • To JFM

        • Sorry I am going to shut up after this. This is turning into an argument and neither of us want that. I am frustrated because there is so much here that I just don't get, while at the same time I am nodding in agreement with other aspects. As I said earlier, I'm willing to assume the problem is with my understanding rather than with Bergson.
        • Re time as a dimension being "false" – I thought that Bergson's position was not that the spatialized view of time was false, but that that it was incomplete. It's obviously a very workable and useful concept in science and everyday life. Durée doesn't make our clocks and calendars stop working.
        • If duration and clock time are both real, then the question becomes, how are they related? One theory (which might not quite be Bergson's, it's more like my crude approximation) is that duration is foundational (more real) and clock time is a sort of intellectual grid we superimpose on it, to turn the raw flux of being into something we can commoditize and think about. But that is the same as "measure", that was my only point. It might do violence to the more primordial duration, but still, we do it.
        • By "quasi-mathematical arguments", I meant that Bergson is touching on ideas that are traditionally the province of mathematics and science, like discrete vs continuous spaces and measurement. This triggers my math thinking. Perhaps they need to be taken in a more metaphysical way, but I'm not sure how to do that.
        • I'm not sure why you think I'm being dismissive; on the contrary I'm doing my best to understand what Bergson is saying (and failing at least half the time, but it's not for lack of trying).
      • an unsent further response

        • And I appreciate what he is trying to do, I think: integrate or reconcile the universal truths of lived experience with the world picture of science and reason. It's just that science has advanced quite a bit since his day. Cybernetic and computational thinking have new perspectives on the issues he thinks about, like perception and memory.
        • This might be the core of my problems with Bergson. One of his goals (which I share) is to reconcile or dissolve the long-standing division between mind and matter. Well, computation does exactly that also, or claims to, in its own way. Not that its answers are definitive or without problems or better than Bergson's, but they occupy a certain ecological niche in my mind and maybe I don't have room for new stuff.
    • Bergson v. Minsky

      • Minsky is my standin for hardcore materialist "reductionist" theories of mind. And now I can invoke him: Philosophical dialogue between Minsky and Bergson | Claude this is actually pretty good:
        • BERGSON: "Illusion!" You see? This is where we diverge irreconcilably. For you, duration is an illusion created by mechanisms. For me, duration is the most real thing—it's your mechanical snapshots that are the illusion, useful fictions we create for practical purposes.
        • MINSKY: [smiling] Maybe we're both right. Maybe "illusion" is the wrong word. Perhaps what I should say is: the mechanisms create something real that transcends them—a genuine experience of flow that exists at a higher level. The experience is real; I'm just trying to explain how it could arise from parts that don't themselves flow.
        • I think their disagreement would center on whether mechanism can explain lived experience, but they'd find common ground in rejecting passive models of mind and in recognizing that consciousness involves complex temporal relations rather than simple "awareness of the present moment."
      • I'm not sure the real Minsky would be that accommodating, but I prompted the AI to be nice.
    • Matter and Memory

      • For it is possible to sum up our conclusions as to pure perception by saying that there is in matter something more than, but not something different from, that which is actually given.
      • Sorry, WTF?
      • But between this perception of matter and matter itself there is but a difference of degree and not of kind, pure perception standing toward matter in the relation of the part to the whole.
      • Again WTF? Seriously what does that mean? Not that perceptions are material representations in the brain, he is against that, so, what? Is this some kind of radical monism? Hm, for a second there I almost understood what he is trying to do, create a reality free of the usual mind/body split. It's a consequence of direct perception; the stuff in our heads is the stuff outside, just reduced and filtered. Except – we know it isn't. We know how perception works. It isn't direct, it's mediated by signals via the nervous system.
      • This continues:
      • This amounts to saying that matter cannot exercise powers of any kind other than those which we perceive. It has no mysterious virtue; it can conceal none.
      • By which he means, it can only "transmit movement", but not contain spirit or mind (I think).
      • The truth is that there is one, and only one, method of refuting materialism: it is to show that matter is precisely that which it appears to be. Thereby we eliminate all virtuality, all hidden power, from matter and establish the phenomena of spirit as an independent reality. But to do this we must leave to matter those qualities which materialists and spiritualists alike strip from it: the latter that they may make of them representations of the spirit, the former that they may regard them only as the accidental garb of space...This, indeed, is the attitude of common sense with regard matter, and for this reason common sense believes in spirit.
      • So he is a dualist then? Actually no fucking clue what is meant here.
      • We must now add that, as pure perception gives us the whole or at least the essential part of matter (since the rest comes from memory and is super-added to matter), it follows that memory must be, in principle, a power absolutely independent of matter.
      • Yes a dualist. How is this any different from say Descartes?
      • He goes on. Perception is a function of the brain, matter, and immediate causality (transmission of movement). Memory is spirit, immaterial, yet somehow linked to the brain since (obviously) damage to the brain can affect it.
      • The first concerns the office of the brain in perception: we maintain that the brain is an instrument of action, and not of representation.
      • WHY NOT BOTH? JFC, this is so close to a good insight but runs into these endless dualisms.
      • That's all from the first chapter, the second seems to go on to explore how memory and brain are related.
      • We become conscious of these mechanisms as they come into play; this consciousness of a whole past of efforts stored up in the present is indeed also a memory, but a memory profoundly different from the first, always bent upon action, seated in the present and looking only to the future. It has retained from the past only the intelligently coordinated movements which represent the accumulated efforts of the past; it recovers those past efforts, not in the memory-images which recall them, but in the definite order and systematic character with which the actual movements take place. In truth it no longer represents our past to us, it acts it; and if it still deserves the name of memory, it is not because it conserves bygone images, but because it prolongs their useful effect into the present moment.
    • Creative Evolution

      • More straightforward than M&M
      • Was controversial in France
      • introduces élan vital but that is often misinterpreted. Mechanism and creationism are spatial, he wants to do time (eh).
      • Vital interiority. Life cannot be reduced to mechanical causation or the blind play of natural selection. Beneath the adaptive mechanisms that science studies, there is an interior, creative effort, an élan vital, which generates living forms and whose freedom and inventiveness mechanism presupposes but cannot explain. (JFM summary)
      • Seems like the usual default normie dualism to me. This denial of "reduction" because machines are low and mind is lofty. Class snobbery, and I'm a leveler I guess. This is why I think Bergson is actually inferior to cybernetics (sorry not supposed to think that), he does not actually have any really good or new ideas about how spirit and mechanism are related, whereas cybernetic materialism does.
      • To live is to make an effort (OK).
      • Forms of life. On Earth, the élan vital expresses itself in three divergent tendencies, modes of maintaining and channeling its act of self-creation ( autopoiesis):
        • Torpor (exemplified in vegetable life), where life turns towards inertia;
        • Instinct (exemplified in arthropods), where life tends towards immediate action;
        • Intelligence (exemplified in vertebrates), where life turns towards action mediated by reflection.
      • That sounds like some pre-scientific a medieval would have thought up. But OK, these are indeed different levels of organization, its clear what his point is.
      • homo faber hey he would be at home at old MIT (mens et manus)
      • mechanism vs creationism (finalism). bergson accepts darwin but then he doesn't because duration/elan vital. Very confused. We must see the creatures from within (which Darwin does not I suppose) Mechanism erases agency (true) and creativity (not really). Evolution does not have a pre-determined plan (yes). elan vital enters into matter and makes it free (argh). Doesn't understand chaos or emergence.
      • life is not mechanical but inventive – this is all obsoleted by 20th century science. Sorry.
      • Bergson was an ant/bee fan, the epitome of instinct
      • Technology is part of evolution (sounds like Kevin Kelly which is not suprising I guess)
      • The intellect can't grasp fully reality (OK with him there). He calls it "digital" but that I might argue with.
      • Thus we must, consciously or unconsciously, have made use of the law of causality. Moreover, the more sharply the idea of efficient causality is defined in our mind, the more it takes the form of a mechanical causality. And this scheme, in its turn, is the more mathematical according as it expresses a more rigorous necessity. That is why we have only to follow the bent of our mind to become mathematicians. But, on the other hand, this natural mathematics is only the rigid unconscious skeleton beneath our conscious supple habit of linking the same causes to the same effects; and the usual object of this habit is to guide actions inspired by intentions, or, what comes to the same, to direct movements combined with a view to reproducing a pattern. We are born artisans as we are born geometricians, and indeed we are geometricians only because we are artisans. Thus the human intellect, inasmuch as it is fashioned for the needs of human action, is an intellect which proceeds at the same time by intention and by calculation, by adapting means to ends and by thinking out mechanisms of more and more geometrical form. Whether nature be conceived as an immense machine regulated by mathematical laws, or as the realization of a plan, these two ways of regarding it are only the consummation of two tendencies of mind which are complementary to each other, and which have their origin in the same vital necessities.
      • p51 (emph added), it almost seems as if he's inventing AI here. Almost.
      • These fleeting intuitions, which light up their object only at distant intervals, philosophy ought to seize, first to sustain them, then to expand them and so unite them together. The more it advances in this work, the more will it perceive that intuition is mind itself, and, in a certain sense, life itself: the intellect has been cut out of it by a process resembling that which has generated matter. Thus is revealed the unity of the spiritual life. We recognize it only when we place ourselves in intuition in order to go from intuition to the intellect, for from the intellect we shall never pass to intuition...Philosophy introduces us thus into the spiritual life.
        • p292 ok there's that word again, I must say I'm allergic. Not that I don't believe in spirit, just that every attempt to talk about it feels off to me.
      • Life as a whole, from the initial impulsion that thrust it into the world, will appear as a wave that rises, and which is opposed by the descending movement of matter.
        • p293 this smacks of a particularly old-fashioned and nasty dualism. Maybe this is my problem, by "matter" he means something more in the alchemical sense of earth, that which is solid, heavy, dull, dead, passive. Real matter is not any of those things necessarily.
    • The Creative Mind

      • Recommended as a good starting point. And I note that while Minsky might be a polar opposite of Bergson's in many ways, the title of his posthumous book Marvin Minsky/Inventive Minds resonates.
      • I was indeed very much struck to see how real time, which plays the leading part in any philosophy of evolution, eludes mathematical treatment. Its essence being to flow, not one of its parts is still there when another part comes along.
      • p12. This is a typical move. Now, evolution (the subject of biological science) operates on clock time which is perfectly measurable and perfectly mathematizable. Even if personal experience is beyond measure.
      • p20 on the calculabiliy (determinedness) of physical systems (as opposed to consciousness, of course)
      • Things and events happen at certain moments; the judgment which determines the occurence of the thing or the event can only come after them; it therefore has its date. But this date at once fades away, in virtue of the principle deep-rooted in our intellect, that all truth is eternal. If the judgment is true now, it seems to us it must always have been so. (p22)
      • Say what now? This is a very static idea of truth, and obviously not applicable to a world of change. I may be missing the point here.
      • p28 psychology breaking with associationism,
      • These conclusions on the subject of duration were,. seemed to me, decisive. Step by step they led me to raise intuition to the level of a philosophical method, “Intuition,” however, is a word whose use caused me some degree of hesitation. Of all the terms which designate a mode of knowing, it is still the most appropriate; and yet it leads to a certain confusion. Because a Schelling, a Schopenhauer and others have already called upon intuition, because they have more or less set up intuition in opposition to intelligence, one might think that I was using the same method. But of course, their intuition was an immediate search for the eternal! Whereas, on the contrary, for me it was a question, above all, of finding true duration. Numerous are the philosophers who have felt how powerless conceptual thought is to reach the core of the mind. Numerous, consequently, are those who have spoken of a supra-intellectual faculty of intuition. But as they believed that the intelligence worked within time, they have concluded that to go beyond the intelligence consisted in getting outside of time. They did not see that intellectualized time is space, that the intelligence works upon the phantom of duration, not on duration itself. that the elimination of time is the habitual, normal, commonplace act of our understanding...to pass from intellection to vision, from the relative to the absolute, is not a question of getting outside of time (we are already there); on the contrary, one must get back into duration and recapture reality in the very mobility which isits essence. -p30
      • Oh interesting (and completely clear for a change). Not sure what getting back into duration consists of – not intellectation though, that's for sure.
      • For the concepts which the intelligence furnishes, the intuition simply substitutes one single concept which includes them all and which consequently is always the same, by whatever name it is called: Substance, Ego, Idea, Will....How much more instructive would be a truly intuitive metaphysics, which would follow the undulations of the real! True, it would not embrace in a single sweep the totality of things; but for each thing it would give an explanation which would fit it exactly, and it alone. It would not begin by defining or describing the systematic unity of the world: who knows if the world is actually one? -p31
      • Also interesting, now he sounds like a radical antifoundationalist or something. So instead of universal principles, we have – well not sure:
      • It is true that philosophy then will demand a new effort for each new problem. No solution will be geometrically deduced from another. No important truth will be achieved by the prolongation of an already acquired truth. We shall have to give up crowding universal science potentially into one principle.
      • Beginning to see why William James was a fan.
      • There is, however, a fundamental meaning: to think intuitively is to think in duration. Intelligence starts ordinarily from the immobile, and reconstructs movement as best it can with immobilities in juxtaposition. Intuition starts from movement, posits it, or rather perceives it as reality itself, and sees in immobility only an abstract moment, a snapshot taken by our mind, of a mobility.
      • I think he makes too much of this. Yes facts tend to describe a static snapshot of the world, but we don't think in just facts (and we have representations that can describe motion and are themselves subject to dynamics).
      • p38 some discussion about the difficulty science has with the mind; here's really a point where he needs to be updated in view of cognitive science.
      • no matter what name you give to the “thing itself,” whether you make of it the Substance of Spinoza, the Ego of Fichte, the Absolute of Schelling, the Idea of Hegel, or the Will of Schopenhauer, it will be useless for the word to present itself with its well-defined signification: it will lose it; it will be emptied of all meaning from the moment it is applied to the totality of things. Speaking only of the last of these great “syntheses,” isn’t it evident that a Will is only will on condition that it is set off against what does not will? How then is mind to be set off against matter, if matter is itself will? To place will everywhere is the same as leaving it nowhere, for it is to identify the essence of what I feel within myself—duration, outpouring, continuous creation—with the essence of what I perceive in things, where there is evidently repetition, previsibility, necessity. It makes little difference to me if one says “Everything is mechanism” or “Everything is will”: in either case everything is identical. In both cases, “mechanism” and “will” become synonyms of “being” and consequently synonyms of each other. Therein lies the initial vice of philosophical systems. They think they are telling us something about the absolute by giving it a name. But once again the word can have a definite meaning when it designates a thing; it loses that meaning as soon as you apply it to all things. -p48
      • Man is essentially a manufacturer. Nature, in denying him ready-made instruments like those the insects have, for example, has given him intelligence, that is to say, the power of inventing and constructing an indefinite number of tools.
      • p64-5 some stuff on how disorder is not necessarily prior to order, but didn't exactly follow. I think the idea is that there is no true disorder, ike there is no true evil, the most you have is an absence.
      • And the essential object of society is to insert a certain fixity into universal mobility. Societies are just so many islands consolidated here and there in the ocean of becoming. -p82
      • That's kind of beautiful, and true – society is made of rituals institutions and Protocols, little islands of stability.
      • That gave me a little glimpse of insight into Bergosn's program and why it is so radical – he really is trying to undo the stodgy static picture of the world as things with properties and relations and view the world in its more dynamic reality.
      • As far as I am concerned, I value scientific knowledge and technical competence as much as intuitive vision. I believe that it is of man’s essence to create materially and morally, to fabricate things and to fabricate himself. Homo faber is the definition I propose. Homo sapiens, born of the reflection Homo faber makes on the subject of his fabrication, seems to me to be just as worthy of esteem as long as he resolves by pure intelligence those problems whicqh depend upon it alone. -p84
      • Yay constructivism although I never know if those kind of concepts and Bergson's are really pointing to the same thing.
      • My initiation into the true philosophical method began the moment I threw overboard verbal solutions, having found in the inner life and important field of experiment. -p89
      • Yeah kind of a problem for a philosopher to eschew "verbal solutions" isn't it? What are we doing here? Again, you wanna be a Zen master, don't talk so much.
      • Some fifty years ago I was very much attached to the philosophy of Spencer. I perceived one fine day that, in it, time served no purpose, did nothing. Nevertheless, I said to myself, time is something. Therefore it acts, What can it be doing? Plain common sense answered: time is what hinders everything from being given at once. It retards, or rather it is retardation. It must therefore, be elaboration. -p93 (emph added)
      • Introduction to Metaphysics

        • If we compare the various ways of defining metaphysics and of conceiving the absolute, we shall find, despite apparent discrepancies, that philosophers agree in making a deep distinction between two ways of knowing a thing. The first implies going all around it, the second entering into it. The first depends on the viewpoint chosen and the symbols employed, while the second is taken from no viewpoint and rests on no symbol. Of the first kind of knowledge we shall say that it stops at the relative; of the second that, wherever possible, it attains the absolute. –p159
        • p159. Two ways of knowing a thing. "Going all around it" and "entering into it". The first is relative, the second is absolute ("wherever possible"). Observing an object in space is relative (from a viewpoint, I guess – wonder if Einstein's language is being echoed).
        • Take, for example, the movement of an object in space. I perceive it differently according to the point of view from which I look at it, whether from that of mobility or of immobility. I express it differently, furthermore, as I relate it to the system of axes or reference points, that is to say, according to the symbols by which I translate it. And I call it relative for this double reason: in either case, I place myself outside the object itself. When I speak of an absolute movement, it means that I attribute to the mobile an inner being and, as it were, states of soul; it also means that I am in harmony with these states and enter into them by an effort of imagination.
        • It's one thing to grant objects an inner being, another to say that in doing so you are in some kind of absolute harmony with them and "enter into them" via imagination. I can't quite see that.
        • There's something very I and Thou about this – another dualistic system, where I/It corresponds to the boring rational ways of knowing and relating, and I/Thou to something deeper and relational. Although Buber isn't that metaphysical (to his credit IMO)
        • He's also clearly a holist, disdainful of the partial representations of the rational mind, although he doesn't use that language exactly. But clearly on that wavelength. No wonder I have trouble.
        • It follows that an absolute can only be given in an intuition, while all the rest has to do with analysis. We call intuition here the sympathy by which one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it. -p161
        • I'm trying hard not to sneer at this stuff. It's very difficult, I'm not sure why I can't just let myself imagine a Bergsonian world, a Bergsonian mind. OK, so if I cultivate my intuition, I can know other objects by their unique and inexpressible essences, via immediate sympathy and without any mediating representations. OK. Nevermind about my certainties about the material nature of my mind and self, let that shit go, its just ideology. (It's not wrong or valueless, but it can be limiting).
          • One can achieve this via meditation, I think. You tamp down the verbal mind, what is left may not be direct apprehension but it feels like it is, and there is no other way to characterize it, so why not accept it?
        • If there exists a means of possessing a reality absolutely, instead of knowing it relatively, of placing oneself within it instead of adopting points of view toward it, of having the intuition of it instead of making the analysis of it, in short, of grasping it over and above all expression, translation or symbolical representation, metaphysics is that very means. Metaphysics is therefore the science which claims to dispense with symbols. -p162
        • OK that is not usually what I think of as metaphysics but what do I know It sounds more like the "Metaphysics" section in bookstores where they keep the occult stuff – although that is all about symbols, so maybe not.
        • There's a long section on the unity of persons that is obviously relevant to my interests but I don't have the energy to slog through it
        • Like empiricism, [rationalism] tries to bind these fragments to one another in order to reconstitute the unity of the person. Like empiricism, in short, it sees the unity of the person elude its grasp like a phantom each time it tries to lay hold of it. -p173
        • That the personality has unity is certain; but such an affirmation does not teach me anything about the extraordinary nature of this unity which is the person. That our self is multiple I further agree, but there is in it a multiplicity which, it must be recognized, has nothing in common with any other. What really matters to philosophy is to know what unity, what multiplicity, what reality superior to the abstract one and the abstract multiple is the multiple unity of the person.
        • OK, some propositions
        • I. There is an external reality which is given immediately to our mind. Common sense is right on this point against the idealism and realism of the philosophers.
        • This seems obviously false to me, and contrary to common sense. But lets go with it for the sake of imagining.
        • II. This reality is mobility.There do not exist things made, but only things in the making, not states that remain fixed, but only states in process of change.
        • I suppose? Certainly nothing is fixed or eternal, Panta Rhei and all that.
        • III. Our mind, which seeks solid bases of operation (point d’apergu), has as its principal function, in the ordinary course of life, to imagine states and things.
        • I suppose?
      • IV. The difficulties inherent in metaphysics, the antinomies it raises, the contradictions into which it falls, the division into opposing schools and the irreducible oppositions between systems, are due in large part to the fact that we apply to the disinterested knowledge of the real the procedures we use currently with practical utility as the aim.
      • V. It was bound to fail. This is the impotence, and this alone, pointed out by the skeptical, idealistic and critical doctrines, all those doctrines, in fact, which question our mind’s ability to attain the absolute. But it does not follow from the fact that we fail to reconstitute living reality with concepts that are rigid and ready-made, that we could not grasp it in any other manner.
      • He's sounding kind of megalomaniacal in these passages.
      • VI. But the truth is that our mind is able to follow the reverse procedure. It can be installed in the mobile reality, adopt its ceaselessly changing direction, in short, grasp it intuitively. But to do that, it must do itself violence, reverse the direction of the operation by which it ordinarily thinks, continually upsetting its categories, or rather, recasting them. In so doing it will arrive at fluid concepts, capable of following reality in all its windings and of adopting the very movement of the inner life of things.
      • He sounds like the neural net people, ot Hofstadter, vs the symbolic AI people. Yay fluidity, although I think he means something uncomputatble.
      • VII. This reversal has never been practised in a methodical manner; but a careful study of the history of human thought would show that to it we owe the greatest accomplishments in the sciences, as well as whatever living quality there is in metaphysics. The most powerful method of investigation known to the mind, infinitesimal calculus, was born of that very reversal. Modern mathematics is precisely an effort to substitute for the ready-made what is in process of becoming, to follow the growth of magnitudes, to seize movement no longer from outside and in its manifest result, but from within and in its tendency towards change, in short, to adopt the mobile continuity of the pattern of things.
      • Sigh I don't understand that at all, and I would like to, having a math degree and all. OK if "ready-made" is just another epithet for the boring measurable spatialized world, he's just tooting the usual horn.
    • Two Sources of Morality and Religion

      • Generally speaking, industry has not troubled enough about the greater or lesser importance of needs to be satisfied. It simply complied with public taste, and manufactured with no other thought than that of selling. Here as elsewhere, we should like to see a central, organizing intelligence, which would co-ordinate industry and agriculture and allot to the machine its proper place, I mean the place where it can best serve humanity.
      • Man will only rise above earthly things if a powerful equipment supplies him with the requisite fulcrum. He must use matter as a support if he wants to get away from matter. In other words, the mystical summons up the mechanical. This has not been sufficiently realized, because machinery, through a mistake at the points, has been switched off on to a track at the end of which lies exaggerated comfort and luxury for the few, rather than liberation for all. We are struck by the accidental result, we do not see mechanization as it should be, as what it is in essence.
      • This is under a section heading "True Vocation of Machinery"
      • If our organs are natural instruments, our instruments must then be artificial organs. The workman's tool is the continuation of his arm, the tool equipment of humanity is therefore a continuation of its body. Nature, in endowing us with an essentially tool-making intelligence, prepared for us in this way a certain expansion...Hence the tremendous social, political and international problems which are just so many definitions of this gap, and which provoke so many chaotic and ineffectual efforts to fill it. What we need are new reserves of potential energy–moral energy this time. So let us not merely say, as we did above, that the mystical summons up the mechanical. We must add that the body, now larger, calls for a bigger soul, and that mechanism should mean mysticism. .... Machinery will find its true vocation again, it will render services in proportion to its power, only if mankind, which it has bowed still lower to the earth, can succeed, through it, in standing erect and looking heavenwards.