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    • AMMDI is an open-notebook hypertext writing experiment, authored by Mike Travers aka @mtraven. It's a work in progress and some parts are more polished than others. Comments welcome! More.
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from Deleuze
  • Linked to La Borde which sounds like a French version of RD Laingism
from algebraic
  • A private phrase I tend to use to mean something like, "this set of concepts has power because it captures some truth in an elegantly formal way". Usually meant admiringly; in that I wish my own thoughts had this powerfully precise bite to them. Freud, Norman O. Brown, RD Laing, are some authors who exhibit this quality of thought (for good or ill).
from Purposive Explanation in Psychology
  • RD Laing as representative of existentialist psychology, anti-mechanist.
from imago
  • RD Laing uses the term, in a mostly perjorative way, as harmful fanatasies that take the place of real relationships, a construct of a "false-self system". This strikes me as naive and I wonder if Jung and others had the same connotation.
Twin Pages

RD Laing

26 Apr 2021 01:35 - 01 Jan 2022 07:48

    • Laing is an extremely lucid writer, and I find myself alternately in violent agreement and disagreement with him.
    • Like many ideas that seemed liberatory in the sixties (communes, geodesic domes), his today seem ludicrously misguided. Yet the problems he (and the communes) were addressing remain, and his analysis is not without value...
    • Random Refs

      • Hm link to Francisco Varela autopoeisis, which is about how organisms generate and maintain boundaries?
    • Notes on The Divided Self

      • talks about imago s:

        • The schizoid individual fears a real live dialectical relationship with real live people. He can relate himself only to depersonalized persons, to phantoms of his own phantasies (imagos) perhaps to things, perhaps to animals. (p77)
        • p18 refactoring
        • The most serious objection to the technical vocabulary currently used to describe psychiatric patients is that it consists of words which split man up verbally in a way which is analogous to the existential splits we have to describe here. But we cannot give an adequate account of the existential splits unless we can begin from the concept of a unitary whole, and no such concept exists, nor can any such concept be expressed within the current language system of psychiatry or psycho-analysis.
        • Sounds very Martin Buber, contrasting relation between whole selves and splitting into id-ego-superego. But also like a holist, and I've been trained to sneer at those.
        • He seems confused about what mechanical means
          • How, even, can one say what it means to hide something from oneself or to deceive oneself in terms of barriers between one part of a mental apparatus and another?
        • One's relationship to an organism is different from one's relation to a person. One's description of the other as organism is as different from one's description of the other as person as the description of side of vase is from profile of face; similarly, one's theory of the other as organism is remote from any theory of the other as person. ne acts towards an organism differently from the way one acts towards a person. The science of persons is the study of human beings that begins from a relationship with the other as person and proceeds to an account of the other still as person.
        • This is a clear statement of a fundamental dualism. There's an obvious rejoinder that if the relationship of the person and organism is two sides of a boundary, it is pretty useful to examine the boundary from both sides!
        • Again, there is no question here or anywhere of a mind-body dualism. The two accounts, in this case personal and organismic, taken up in respect to speech or any other observable human activity, are each the outcome of one's initial intentional act; each intentional act leads in its own direction and yields its own results...Man as seen as an organism or man as seen as a person discloses different aspects of the human reality to the investigator. Both are quite possible methodologically but one must be alert to the possible occasion for confusion.
          • even more Buberish.
        • The other as person is seen by me as responsible, as capable of choice, in short, as a self-acting agent.
          • Noting the a-word
        • Note for the non-programmers: software construction is doing just this kind of dance between mental and mechanism.
        • It seems extraordinary that whereas the physical and biological sciences of it-processes have generally won the day against tendencies to personalize the world of things or to read human intentions into the animal world, an authentic science of persons has hardly got started by reason of the inveterate tendency to depersonalize or reify persons
        • In the following pages, we shall be concerned specifically with people who experience themselves as automata, as robots, as bits of machinery, or even as animals. Such persons are rightly regarded as crazy. Yet why do we not regard a theory that seeks to transmute persons into automata or animals as equally crazy
          • – Hm! What would he have thought of AI...guess scandalized, Maybe Weizenbaum is his stand-in.