AMMDI is an open-notebook hypertext writing experiment, authored by Mike Travers aka mtraven. It's a work in progress and some parts are more polished than others. Comments welcome! More.
A term I apparently invented for the position that essentially everything is real, including ideas, patterns, gods. "God" ≡ God is a special case. Also applies to things like selves and free will – sure, they are real, if not in quite the same way as rocks and chairs. They are real because we can and do refer to them. They may be closer to ghostly images on a screen than actual matter.
This idea lines up with the WS ideology, if it has one. Although I always feel there is something wrong with their worldview. Not "wrong" wrong, but different from mine, enough so that I am not sure how to even talk with them.
It's the opposite of eliminativism, basically. Eliminativism decrees some things are unreal and should not be talked about. Eliminated from discourse, from proper thought. Ok for folk-psychology but what we are doing is something better than that. More scientific.
I can't tell if this is a brilliant or stupid term, or jsut a dull one. Of course ideas and gods are real in this sense, but that doesn't make them ontologically equal of physical objects.
I suppose it's still philosophy and so bad. Trying to put a label on some obvious truth, only because of bad earlier labels.
You're right that "panrealism" seems like it should be a term - it's a very logical construction! The closest established philosophical position would be ontological liberalism (also called ontological permissivism). This is the view that existence is "cheap" and that our ontology should be quite inclusive rather than restrictive.
Ontological liberals argue that we should generally accept that things exist rather than being skeptical about their existence. Philosopher Amie Thomasson has been a prominent defender of this kind of view. The basic idea is that if we have conceptual schemes that seem to refer to certain kinds of things (numbers, fictional characters, social institutions, etc.), we should generally accept that those things exist in the relevant sense rather than trying to eliminate them from our ontology.
Other somewhat related positions include:
Meinongianism - the view that there are objects that have "being" even if they don't "exist" (so in some sense, more things are real than we might think)
Ontological maximalism - though this term is less established in the literature
You're absolutely right that eliminativism represents the opposite impulse - trying to show that things we think exist (like beliefs, consciousness, moral facts, etc.) should be eliminated from our best theory of what's real.
It's interesting that "panrealism" hasn't caught on as a term, since it would be a neat way to capture the maximally inclusive ontological stance. The philosophical community can be somewhat conservative about terminology, but there's nothing stopping the term from gaining traction if it proves useful!