David Bentley Hart has criticized Daniel Dennett's naturalist theory of mind on various occasions, arguing that Dennett's approach is reductionist, materialistic, and fails to account for the subjective nature of consciousness. Dennett, on the other hand, has responded to these criticisms in several ways.
Firstly, Dennett has argued that his approach is not reductionist in the sense that he is not reducing subjective experience to something purely objective. Rather, he is trying to provide a naturalistic explanation for subjective experience that is consistent with scientific findings. According to Dennett, subjective experience is a complex phenomenon that arises from the interaction of various processes in the brain, and it is possible to understand these processes without invoking anything supernatural.
Secondly, Dennett has rejected the charge of materialism, stating that he is not claiming that everything is reducible to matter. Instead, he argues that the mind is a complex system that cannot be reduced to any single element, be it matter or something else. In this sense, Dennett's approach is more nuanced than the crude materialism that Hart is criticizing.
Thirdly, Dennett has argued that his approach does not ignore the subjective nature of consciousness. On the contrary, he believes that subjective experience is a crucial aspect of consciousness, and he has proposed several theories to explain it. One such theory is his multiple drafts model, which posits that there is no single "stream of consciousness" but rather multiple competing drafts of experience that are constantly being revised and integrated.
Overall, Dennett would likely respond to Hart's criticisms by arguing that his approach is not as reductionist, materialistic, or dismissive of subjective experience as Hart suggests. Rather, he would maintain that his naturalistic approach to the mind is grounded in empirical evidence and provides a more comprehensive understanding of consciousness than any supernatural explanation could.
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