Interesting propositions of epistemic attitudes that can be applied in this case include socio-pragmatic constructivism (Bjeković et al., 2014) and representative pragmatism (Travers, 2011).
But then e.g. pragmatic ontologists like Barry Smith can propose “rules” for metaontology that aren’t formal procedures but guidelines, which also themselves support metarationality, e.g. one of his rules is that ontology systems need good support for versioning and revision
— Mikael Brockman 🥸 (@meekaale) April 17, 2021
Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but. . . in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed. A pragmatist . . . turns away from abstraction and insufficiency. . . .from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns toward concreteness and adequacy, and towards power. . . It means the open air and the possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality, and the pretense of finality in truth.
. . . pragmatism [is] a mediator and reconciler. . . that ‘unstiffens’ our theories. . . . pragmatism is willing to take anything, to follow either logic or the senses and to count the humblest and most personal experiences.