Transparency leands to a "naive realism", the tacit assumption that the content of phenomenal consciusness has a direct contact to the environment, and is not a mere construct.
Experiences are always and only experiences of an ‘‘I’’ (see Stamenov, 2003 for linguistic implications). It is me, who realizes the taste of wine. The ‘‘I’’ in every primary experience is implicitly and pre-reflectively present in the field of awareness and is crucial to the whole structure. The ‘‘I’’ is not a "pole" but more a field, through which all experiences pass (and it is never to be confused with a homunculus, a ‘‘mind in the mind’’). This basic self does not arise from any inferential reflection or introspection, because it is not a relation, but an intrinsic property of primary experiences.
What is this particular functional property of ‘‘myness’’ that makes it the centre of consciousness? ‘‘Myness’’ (Ipseity) might be granted in the brain by a continuous source of internally generated input...
There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense of agency to an internal feed-forward mechanism, called the “comparator model”. In this paper, we draw a sharp distinction between a non-conceptual level of feeling of agency and a conceptual level of judgement of agency
Varied research findings have been taken to support the claim that humans' representation of the self is "special," that is, that it emerges from systems that are physically and functionally distinct from those used for more general purpose cognitive processing. The authors evaluate this claim by reviewing the relevant literatures and addressing the criteria for considering a system specia