@Self-consciousness, self-agency, and schizophrenia

12 Mar 2023 03:52 - 17 Jun 2023 08:29
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    • Abstract
      • Empirical approaches on topics such as consciousness, self-awareness, or introspective perspective, need a conceptual framework so that the emerging, still unconnected findings can be integrated and put into perspective. We introduce a model of self-consciousness derived from phenomenology, philosophy, the cognitive, and neurosciences. We will then give an overview of research data on one particular aspect of our model, self-agency, trying to link findings from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Finally, we will expand on pathological aspects of self-agency, and in particular on psychosis in schizophrenia. We show, that a deficient self-monitoring system underlies, in part, hallucinations and formal thought (language) disorder in schizophrenia. We argue, that self-consciousness is a valid construct and can be studied with the instruments of cognitive and neuroscience.
    • Notes
      • Comparing first-person and third-person perspectives. Weirdly (to me) uses "transparency" to mean the way in which we are not conscious of fundamental neural processing, so it appears our access to the world is transparent when it is not.
      • Transparency leands to a "naive realism", the tacit assumption that the content of phenomenal consciusness has a direct contact to the environment, and is not a mere construct.
      • Good references to things I should read Metzinger, etc.
      • Experiences are always and only experiences of an ‘‘I’’ (see Stamenov, 2003 for linguistic implications). It is me, who realizes the taste of wine. The ‘‘I’’ in every primary experience is implicitly and pre-reflectively present in the field of awareness and is crucial to the whole structure. The ‘‘I’’ is not a "pole" but more a field, through which all experiences pass (and it is never to be confused with a homunculus, a ‘‘mind in the mind’’). This basic self does not arise from any inferential reflection or introspection, because it is not a relation, but an intrinsic property of primary experiences.
      • OK well it's hard to talk about this stuff, give them props for trying.
      • Primary self-experiences: self-agency, self-coherence, self-affectivity, self-history (autobiographical memory)
      • What is this particular functional property of ‘‘myness’’ that makes it the centre of consciousness? ‘‘Myness’’ (Ipseity) might be granted in the brain by a continuous source of internally generated input...